Anthropocene, Technocene and the Problem of Philosophy of Education*

Eva Dědečková
Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences, v. v. i.
Slovakia
dedeckova.e@gmail.com
ORCID ID: 0000-0002-0822-1911

Simon J. Charlesworth
Allgemeine Soziologie und Soziologische Theorie, Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Germany
johnwck90@yahoo.co.uk

Abstract
The term Anthropocene began to appear more often in scientific discourse more than 20 years ago. It was an attempt to come closer to understanding the depth and seriousness of the impact of man and his activities on the planet Earth, with the intention in the future to mitigate these effects and prevent a possible globally catastrophic environmental collapse, which might involve the collapse of civilisation itself. However, to date, our approach to the world has hardly changed at all. After the pandemic comes the threat of a world conflict, a nuclear war. Since our scientific wisdom seems powerless, even the most obvious and frightening scientific knowledge cannot somehow change the course of global society. We want to think about this situation from the perspective of the cosmological philosophy of education. Its central motive is the philosophical disclosure of the original ontological ground of our humanity, which is the world, the cosmos. This is a direct confrontation with the hitherto prevailing “market education”, which serves to maintain and consolidate the power schemes of capital policy.

Keywords
Anthropocene; Technology; Philosophy of education; World; Fink (Eugen); Nietzsche (Friedrich).

Resumo
O termo Antropoceno começou a aparecer com mais frequência no discurso científico há mais de 20 anos. Foi uma tentativa de aproximar-se da compreensão da profundidade e gravidade do impacto do homem e suas atividades no planeta Terra, com a intenção de, no futuro, mitigar esses efeitos e evitar um possível colapso ambiental global catastrófico, que poderia envolver o colapso da própria civilização. No entanto, até ao momento, a nossa abordagem do mundo praticamente não mudou. Depois da pandemia veio a ameaça de um conflito mundial, uma guerra nuclear. Como o nosso saber científico parece impotente, mesmo o conhecimento científico mais óbvio e assustador não pode de alguma forma mudar o curso da sociedade global. Queremos pensar essa situação a partir da perspectiva da filosofia cosmológica da educação. O seu motivo central é a revelação filosófica do fundamento ontológico original de nossa humanidade, que é o mundo, o cosmos. É um confronto direto com a “educação de mercado” até agora prevalente, que serve para manter e consolidar os esquemas de poder da política do capital.

Palavras-chave
Antropoceno; Tecnologia; Filosofia da educação; Mundo; Fink (Eugen); Nietzsche (Friedrich).

* This article is part of VEGA project no. 2/0072/21 Tasks of Political Philosophy in the Context of Anthropocene.
It has been more than 20 years since we found the right term, Anthropocene, which should help us to better understand the current historical, environmental situation in which we, collectively, as humanity, find ourselves (Cf. Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000, pp. 17-18). Since then, instead of taking effective action, we have found a number of other scientific terms that – in addition to encouraging the pursuit of scientific mastery of the problem – should have made the description of the crisis of world civilization even more emotionally acute.¹ Has anything changed? Have we moved towards deepening the relationship with the Earth and is this relationship finally fully part of our actions, our behaviour in everyday life? Hardly... Instead of the climate crisis finally uniting us as humanity, business is running as usual, we are even reaching for – already standard – military tools for resolving ideological and economic conflicts. Well, why not throw a log, in the form of the threat of nuclear conflict, into the fire that is increasingly engulfing our civilisation?

The influence of man on the environment in which he exists has been evident since the Neolithic period. It seems that what was essential, however, was not just a simple change of lifestyle – from hunter-gatherer to settled farming – but the idea of private ownership. The fatal moment when the land, soil (among other things) became the object of ownership, i.e., in another sense, also the subject of trade and, therefore, in the end, it has become simply an economic good, a resource. We dare to assert that this moment is of far more fundamental importance for the history of civilisation than the later great (also known as the first) Industrial Revolution in the 18th century. In fact, it was indeed a transformation of the relationship to the world, to nature, and to culture, which became itself a medium of distinction and prelude to ownership, an extension of property-rights, into even the realm of spiritual goods. Nowhere is this more evident than in the contemporary academy and, particularly, in the field of higher education. A very interesting observation in relation to the issue of the relationship between transformation and the importance of institutions and technical innovations is an article of Samuel Bowles and Jung-Kyoo Choi The Neolithic Agricultural Revolution and the Origins of Private Property (2019, pp. 2186-2228), in which they argue – contrary to the widespread theory that only technical and technological progress allows changes in economic institutions (e.g. K. Marx, H. Demsetz and others) –, that it was actually institutional transformation that has allowed technological development at all. It is difficult to decide which came first, the chicken or the egg, but the ideologically formative power of institutions, reflected especially in the field of the philosophy of

¹ There are various concepts, e.g. Technosphere, Technocene and its deep interconnection to Anthropocene, Anthropocene risks, Technium, etc. (See more in Mendes, 2021, pp. 1-14.)
education, is simply unquestionable. As Bourdieu suggests, «(...) the functioning of any economic system is tied to the existence of a definite system of dispositions toward the world (...)» (1979, p. 6). This is manifest in contexts where the dispositions required for adjustment to economic institutions are absent, in times of rapid economic change, for example, when dispositions are eroded as the grounds of individuals sources of actualisation are effaced, leading to mal-adaptation.

But why do we raise the question of the philosophy of education here? Although Crutzen and Stoermer (2000, pp. 17-18) date the beginning of the Anthropocene period to the 18th century (and they connect this explicitly with the invention of the steam engine by James Watt, that is, with technical progress that also made possible the subsequent institutional transformation of western society), we could rather argue that this Industrial Revolution was only the “fruit” of the ancient Neolithic revolution, which – as we mentioned – had a much deeper meaning, because of the radical (institutional) transformation of the relation to the world, and to nature. However, this issue has little resonance in the environment of the current philosophy of education, which is largely subject to its own institutional structuration. Therefore, even Crutzen’s and Stoermer’s formulation of the “great tasks of mankind”, the solution of which should be in the competence of «(...) more intensive research efforts and wise application of knowledge (...)» (Crutzen and Stoemer, 2000, p. 18), is largely naive and blind to the philosophical basis of this problem. Namely, “research efforts” and so-called “applications of knowledge” are absolutely useless if they take place within the framework of an unchanged institutional network, whose philosophy of education is, first of all, the market and the preservation of the capitalist social hierarchy. Science is not an exception and, on the contrary, it often serves to legitimate principles (it is hardly possible to go beyond its own shadow) which are the expression of the interests constitutive of its conditions of possibility. One only has to look at the way in which a virus, probably manufactured in a laboratory, has been used to create possibilities relating to its public signification by scientific authorities, in order to be left in no doubt as to the roots of scientific practice in the corporate world that constitutes its form. If the procedure suggested by Crutzen and Stoermer was sufficient, we might expect to be somewhere else after more than 20 years. Not to mention that scientists and philosophers have been aware of the seriousness of the impact of human activity since at least the mid-19th century, leading to a questioning of enlightenment belief in rationalistic visions of unrelenting progress (cf. Crutzen and Stoermer, p. 17). Simply, the idea of the “knowledge or information society”

2 Quite interestingly, the problem of the emergence and transformation of institutions as a form of relief, safety and security, reflected Arnold Gehlen in his work Urmensch und Spätkultur [Primordial man and late culture] in 1956 (see Gehlen, 2016).
3 See, for example, the interview with the Harvard scientist Dr. Alina Chan (Kaplan, 2021).
is too full of pitfalls and risks, unless we perceive the "mycelium" from which this knowledge and information is engendered, never being value- or ideologically neutral as institutionalised forms.

The Problem of the Philosophy of Education

Why, in fact, do we need to draw more attention to the problem of the philosophy of education? And what can we even imagine via this term, which itself automatically evokes a kind of rationalised and institutionally controlled process of "indoctrination" of specific ideals, values and orienting frameworks that are supposed to "process" and "prepare" the educated person for a successful life in society?

The German philosopher Eugen Fink (1905 – 1975) drew attention to the problem of the relation to the World, which implied a crisis of values of Western civilisation itself, especially after World War II. The institutional-technical hybrid, materialised in a nation that considered itself the most spiritual in Europe, even the direct heir of the ancient Greeks, purposefully and without much embarrassment, industrially killed people, and, with them, any faith in, and possibly hope for, a humane, highly educated (Western) civilisation. This cataclysmic civilisational upheaval brought Fink back to the great question mark in the history of philosophy – to Friedrich Nietzsche and his philosophy, which long ago announced the decline of Europe, although paradoxically it was Nietzsche’s ideas that were grossly abused and misinterpreted by Nazi ideology, thanks to his sister.

In essence, Fink finally “rehabilitated” Nietzsche precisely by brilliantly interpreting his philosophy as cosmological (see Fink, 1979 or 2003). It is with his emphasis on the world that Nietzsche goes beyond metaphysics, interpreting the freedom and creativity of man in the sense of participation in the great Play of the World, without meaning in itself. The “incorporation” of this cruel, but liberating truth, relinquishes any need for “God”, the promise of a posthumous reward, confronting us with the terrible depth of life and its eternal ebb and flow. In the explicit and unconditional “Yes” to life, the will to power (which in Nietzsche means first and foremost overcoming oneself, overcoming one’s own limitations

4 For the philosophy of Eugen Fink is characteristic of the so-called cosmological differentiation, which distinguishes between the World (here with a capital letter) as an independent, all-transcending force, the cosmic whole, and the world (here with a small initial letter) as a sphere of the inner-world beings, including our highly functional idea of the “world” as a storehouse of things, complex inner-world relations, etc. In short, the point is to perceive the difference between the “cosmic” and “existential” concept of the world. The simplest definition is offered by Fink in his work Einleitung in die Philosophie (1985, p. 106): “Den Unterschied von Welt und dem, was in ihr ist, nennen wir die kosmologische Differenz”. (“The difference between the World and what is in it, we call the cosmological difference”). See also Fink, 1990, p. 19.

5 The author elaborated on this issue in detail in her Finkian monograph (2018).
and prejudices) reaches its peak – it becomes will to will. I live because I want to. I don’t need a reason to think life is worth living. (The reasons, of course, in fact require a so-called life in society, hermetically closed in the form of an economic unit, appearing as an absolute totality, or even a cosmic law.) It is only in human creativity that there is the possibility of constant self-overcoming even in the context of a certain historical situation – that is, in our freedom no one (not even God) and nothing (not even the authority of the institution) can represent or replace us. The individual has to feel possessed of possibilities whose form are means of expression of the will so that they accede to representational states of intentionality arising from the confluence of the person in a world whose solicitations facilitate the actualisation of cognitively significant, will-full, states. The concept of the so-called overman (Übermensch), to which one must first be brought up, as Nietzsche recalls, does not mean only some biological adaptation, but rather an inner refinement. This time, however, not in the sense of freeing oneself from the “inhuman” World, but of freeing oneself to the World as the proper and only home, where not only brightness reigns, but also darkness and various shades between them as natural, i.e. beyond any moral assessment. In this lies the innocence of the World, about which Zarathustra speaks (Nietzsche, 1988b, p. 209; see also Fink, 2010, p. 220).

Nietzsche already in his Untimely Meditations (1873 – 1876) harshly criticises educational institutions and their “philosophy” of education, which aims to produce slaves for the market (Nietzsche, 1988a, pp. 387-388; 393-401). Already here, the young, 29-year-old Nietzsche draws attention to the crime that the state, through educational institutions, is committing on young people and, de facto, on its own future. He very openly and uncompromisingly recalls the fundamental thing – that institutional indoctrination of the idea of a one-dimensional world, i.e. the world as a purely economic unit is not any real philosophy of education (and, consequently, does not serve the cultural growth of society, quite the contrary), but only a systematic application of political imperatives, motivated by the vision of economic and industrial growth (Nietzsche, 1988a, pp. 383-389). Here we can immediately recognise a form of “pedagogy” that exists as a systemic tool for the application of specific procedures to the promotion of a particular interest, i.e. having the social world as a self-evident basis on which we describe educational practices, typologically define them in relation to the desired formal goals and in retrospect “justify” this social world with psychological and sociological views (Fink, 1992, pp. 43-44). The philosophy of education – in contrast to pedagogy as a science – is not even supposed to be a kind of project of “anthropology”, but is a philosophical access to the original ontological ground of our humanity – and this is the World, the Cosmos. Therefore, it is precisely the cosmological philosophy of education that can be important in fulfilling the already existential necessity for man to fully understand his earthliness and definite finiteness; that without a natural,
authentic relation to the World (but not as an object of eternal business), already at the level of every ordinary person, neither more effective scientific research nor more consistent “application” of scientific knowledge will help us. Thus, the climax, or twilight, of the Anthropocene should be a dispute between the cosmological philosophy of education, which primarily emphasizes the creative relationship to the World as a force independent of our existence (even if we destroy our environment, it does not mean that together with our existence will end the World itself or life, which after all existed millions of years without us), and the prevailing education for the market, which de facto institutionally enforces the power schemes and relations of the class owning the majority of global capital.6

Institutional Processes and Dislocated Education

It is worth considering the way in which the experience of education is itself an effect of the nature of particular kinds of institutional process that relate to the context in which education arises. The general idea is that educational institutions mediate access to public forms that engender capacities so that individuals can accede to position in the world. Such is the public significance of educational institutions that it tends to be the domain of fiercely protected, ideologically invested, representations that sublimate, while expressing the interests of the institutional agents who act on reality by producing representations of it, whose institutional implications benefit them. The sublimation of interests, paradoxically, produces highly euphemised forms of discourse that obscure the banal reality of the institutional forms that people encounter. This is why there are few representations of the actual nature of educational processes. The concept of “education” is used by groups to appear to offer solutions to a multitude of problems and its reality is effaced as part of this colonisation of the public sphere via the good-intentions that ideational projection facilitates. The reality is that educational institutions are nested amidst structural conditions that are effaced via the use of a singular notion, “education”, to cover a multitude of forms that may have little family resemblance. As Bourdieu describes:

(...) there are the schools that have been hastily put up in ghettoized suburbs where they are intended for ever greater numbers of ever more culturally disadvantaged students... On the other hand, there are the schools that have been carefully maintained where the student life

---

6 This problem is also highlighted by Nietzsche himself, when he talks about the need to look around for other institutions and, quite understandably, emphasizes that educators must first be educated: «Erzieher erziehen! Aber die ersten müssen sich selbst erziehen! Und für diese schreibe ich.» / «Educate educators! But the first educators must educate themselves! And it is for these that I write.» (Nietzsche, 1988c, p. 47).
of upper- and middle-class students is not at all different from the one their fathers or grandfathers knew (...). The difficulties, even the anxieties that touch families and students in the elite sections of the top Parisian lycées differ as night and day when compared to those encountered by students in the vocational junior high schools in the poverty-stricken housing projects in the big cities (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 421).

The nature of these institutions, and their processes, escape examination and yet they are of fundamental importance to understanding the formation of distinct expressive physiognomies rooted in the sources of public realization characteristic of distinct class fractions. The key problem, educationally, is that educational institutions cannot support cultural forms whose exclusivity is sustained via the nature of the way properties are distributed in the class structure.

The nature and quality of education varies markedly, leading to marked differences in nature, and quality, among the products of the process. These issues raise questions about the nature of the modalities available to different class groups, manifest, clearly, by labour market segregation and by differences in destiny, or in the life-chances constituted via their representation on CVs where the instrumentalized culture of the institutionally consecrated is constituted via their objectification, with the contemporary poor being manifest by CVs marked by credentials whose worthlessness are manifest by the absence of any institutional embedding characteristic of the bankrupt processes via which they are procured.

These processes are testimony to a shift in the nature of the institutional mediations that subtend the contemporary labour market, and in the nature of the relation of educational processes to it, that tell us something fundamental about the nature of economic organization. In the nineteen eighties in the UK, for example, we moved, inside one-generation, from a situation where working class people would have no post-compulsory education to one where local tertiary colleges tripled student intake and going to university came to be organized as an, almost, inescapable aspect of a transition that became more fraught with anxiety the more institutionally mediated it became. Young people who graduated from higher education in this way had long-term difficulties in getting a job at all. As John Smith (forty year old, recently completed a PhD, unemployed) described:

I think of four generations of working class forebears who were barely literate... I am the most educated working class person my... family has ever produced... I am now worse off than I have ever been... now I’ve got cultural capital I realize my disempowerment, nobody is ever going to con me in thinking my degree is worth anything the reason nobody
is gonna con me into thinking it’s worth anything is ‘cos I’ve got a PhD and it’s worthless.7

Contemporary societies have become increasingly symbolically violent as institutions are used to engender needs whose legitimacy arise from what is effaced via the spurious inclusivity of educational institutions: institutionally mediated access to sources of objectification, that is, to exclusive goods, or symbolic forms, constituted via closure. The more stringently positions in social space are secured by the determining efficacy of the symbolic power arising from the capacity of the middle classes to exchange private wealth for mediations that disclose existential modalities relating to their public mobilization, the more contested, and annihilated, the working class become, and the more it appears they are in need of educational action.

The problem is that education itself becomes enmired in the processes that determine positions in the social order. What educational institutions cannot do is address the effects of the private use of institutions to constitute significances whose efficacy arise from the surreptitious use of public space precisely to institute such distinctions. This is why, as Bourdieu puts it, «(...) specific qualifications (...) are a genuine ticket of entry only for those who are able to supplement the official qualifications with the real – social – qualifications» (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 152) and why «recruitment is generally done by co-option, that is, on the basis of ‘connections’ and affinities of habitus...» (Bourdieu 1984, p. 151). Divisions are contested, publicly, via their symbolisation, that is, they are constituted via interpersonal disclosures that inaugurate referentiality and transpose meaning via its effects on being so that the physiognomic materialisation of intentional aspects is part of the very fabric of social life, that affect institutional processes, particularly those that mediate access to the labour market.

The issue, then, is the very nature of the way educational processes are institutionally constituted as an effect of economic divisions, and the institutional mediations that subtend their form, which lead to the huge difference in the nature of education, as an experience, for rich and poor. Fundamentally, elite education is situated and interpersonally realising, involving direct mediation and access to shared contexts, constituted via co-presence, whereas the education of the poor is usually poor education, involving little by way of contextualisation, and processes constituted via abstract mediations bereft of co-presence. It is not hard to see that such processes would lead to the expression of different properties. Competition for a position in the social order ensures processes of devaluation of the forms required to accede to membership and, as credential inflation embeds, publicly, the dependency of the poor on mediating institutions

7 The testimonies cited are the hitherto unpublished result of many years of empirical sociological research focused on the problems of the working class in England.
becomes a prominent aspect of the experience of an unemployment that educational institutions are used to obscure as successive governments lie to themselves whilst producing, institutionally, the appearance of social justice. In reality, the problems of the poor are magnified via such conditions. Sam Blyth, a fifty year old teacher in a local further education college, depicts the nature of the processes that circumscribe what is available to the most dispossessed:

(...) the colleges are culturally, economically and strategically distanced from the very sector that they theoretically are there to support. They... teach courses but then ditch the students on completion... there is never access to impartial and supportive advice... because courses are funded on student numbers so staff sold the courses to potential students to ensure they had a job... Staff do everything to keep em and virtually do the work as it’s all based on course work so no one fails to ensure retention and achievement is at national benchmark or above. Lower than that means that when Ofsted look at the figures it impacts on the college grade. Most people in FE worry more about Ofsted than the Shyte students were being peddled and they were glad to be rid as long as retention and completion figures were above national benchmark figures... What they should say is if a course has high achievement it is worthless and if it’s a humanities with that type of profile it's even worse than that. Science don't have that profile it's too hard to fiddle the results and that’s why it's not in FE colleges as it knackers their inspection profile. They get paid on retention and achievement not on whether the students have anything that gets them a job. Now colleges are full of ex-students who teach because they have a degree but can’t get a job. Now the government say colleges are there to prepare the young for employment, but look at it. Ofsted assess and give grades, staff teach and students go through a vacuous process that is a process of destroying their personal confidence. The irony is all the parties involved have never worked in commerce, industry or anything other than education. The only courses worth following are construction and engineering but the staff don't last because they realize how corrupt the process is and go back to industry because it’s more rewarding than watching kids get sold down the river by a process of little benefit to them.  

What this person confronts is the nature of a reality which is expressed in physiognomy as it is etched into being via the circumscriptions of forms that structure what is available. The institutions cannot substitute forms that remain highly contested and individuals remain affected by the poverty of processes mediated via necessity, the deprivation of essential forms that human fruition

---

8 See footnote 7.
requires. As this person concludes, «students go through a vacuous process that is a process of destroying their personal confidence».

This exclusion is experienced via the absence of real possibility. As Adam Connelly, a local sixth form student, said, «unless yer some kind'r genius who can get A’s in maths and science, thi’s now’t the’er». The structuring potency of absence is directly experienced, «...the future is a void which it would be futile to try to grasp, a nothingness which does not belong to us» (Bourdieu, 1979, p. 16): there is nothing, “there”: “there” is constituted via an absence that inflects being. Without mediations that can ground possibilities the absence of any future annuls the present, annihilating the will in a condition that precludes its exercise.

What is apparent is the absurdity of education bereft of any meaningful experience of realisation in relation to the disclosure of a horizon whose determinacy is constituted via experiences of being publicly contextualised. As Bourdieu describes:

(…) there exists, in the social world, a category, that of subproletarians, which highlights these conditions by showing what happens when life is turned into a ‘game of chance’(qmar), as an unemployed Algerian put it, and when the limited desire for power which is habitus in a sense capitulates before the more or less long-lasting experience of powerlessness. Just as, as psychologists have observed, the annihilation of chances associated with crisis situations leads to the collapse of psychological defences, so here it leads to a kind of generalized and lasting disorganization of behaviour and thought linked to the disappearance of any coherent vision of the future (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 221).

The disorganisation of behaviour is an effect of the absence of the satisfaction conditions required to accede to cognitively significant forms and this absence of mediation is part of a generalised malaise that inflicts harm. It is difficult to do justice, representationally, to the depth of the crisis inflected via this summation of the reality.

Notice the parameters: the absence of sources of public actualisation and the meaninglessness that renders education as absurd as it is de-realising; the violence of the language arises from the violating nature of the absence of possibility and the sickening nature of the experience of being condemned to a purely privatised form of existence, and to the idleness of those who lack the value to accede to recognised forms of public existence, to social position (Charlesworth, 1999). We see that education arises from divisions that affect its form. What you have are attempts to produce the appearance of auxiliary positions in the labour market, under the guise of education and training, whose relationships of involvement are not analogous to those characteristic of the labour market, even in relation to what people are supposed to be training-in, and, thereby, consequentially, people’s labour is not recognised and their labour power
is undermined by its constitutive conditions, which is, practically, why credentials are not validated and pathways lead nowhere but to the perpetuation of a condition relating to the private sphere of capital, the original position, which is transfigured into new ways of being-perceived that legitimate discrimination via these modes of reproduction that favour societies with a pressing need to obscure functional structural unemployment. As Jane Bloggs, a fifty year old secretary, describes:

Most of my friends have been unemployed for long periods, many work freelance because they simply can’t get stable employment, it’s just part of being a humanist now. You have to send about forty to one-hundred applications. Humanists have it hard. It is very hard to find any job now.9

One can appreciate why Bourdieu and Wacquant suggest:

(…) many of the most intimate dramas, the deepest malaises, the most singular suffering that women and men can experience find their roots in the objective contradictions, constraints and double binds inscribed in the structures of the labour and housing markets, in the merciless sanctions of the school system, or in mechanisms of economic and social inheritance (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 201).

As Julie Briggs, a forty year old working in a local travel agency, describes:

The labour market is too competitive nowadays. You know there was times when I really feel that I couldn’t go through with all the stress of working and feeling alone anymore. I feel like giving up everything. Many time I felt like I’m such a failure cos I didn’t achieve anything real in life. I see my friends have good career and have own family, I felt very sad. I guess I just need to tell myself to stay strong. When I was in my twenties, my mum use to say, find good man who has a good job, have a big house, have a big car but now she only say, can you please bring whoever you want back home, let us meet him.10

What characterizes today’s state of the labour market, especially for humanities graduates, was very accurately pronounced by Bourdieu already more than forty years ago:

The pressure of the “reserve army”, always strongly felt, is sometimes expressed explicitly (…) in vague, general judgements (…) “there are too many people” (…) In such a context, competition for work is the primary form of the struggle for life, a struggle which, for some, begins anew every morning and has no more rules than a game of chance (Bourdieu, 1979, p. 33-34).

9 See footnote 7.
10 See footnote 7.
To this day, the philosophy of education has not changed. And with the upcoming radical transformation of the labour market (robotisation), an even greater number of people will experience this struggle for their lives.

The Cosmological Philosophy of Education in the Context of Technocene

We have indicated the necessity and significance of the cosmological philosophy of education, the basis of which is openness to the world, the symbol of which is a play without meaning in itself (see more in Fink, 2010 or 2016). If we also want to reflect on the second, sister side of the Anthropocene, we cannot fail to mention the importance and meaning that technology can have in the context of the cosmological philosophy of education.

According to Fink, the total economisation of human life has caused and continues to radicalise the shift of the problem of education into the institutional environment, making the technique easier to penetrate into the sphere of education and upbringing in a refined form of political manipulation in order to create currently desirable human types (Fink, 1992, p. 12). Education and upbringing for the market implies that the phenomenon of labour takes on itself a dubious ontological meaning. Namely, as Minna Lumila notes (2020, p. 104), if education lacks a sense of the fundamentally formative dimension of a person's relationship to the World, then it distorts and makes it impossible for a person to develop meaningful relationships to work and the products of work, because they are still the result of a subject-object preconcepti- on, obtained through a traditionally (metaphysical) humanistic pedagogical concept. We come to Fink's remarkable idea that modern technology itself, or rather, the human working with machines, is a kind of education in itself (Lumila, 2020, p. 104). It is something that forces us to rethink the metaphysical concept of creativity.

What – from the perspective of cosmological philosophy – meets the “ideal” and “material” in connection with technology is the problem of creative freedom. Lumila states: «Thus, according to Fink, technology comes from human freedom, which also manifests itself in the form of technology» (Lumila, p. 106). From this, then, arise the possibilities of “technical education”, which – on the basis of cosmological philosophy – connects the material and ideal side of production at the moment of creative freedom. This has its (desired) consequences also in the form of a strong distortion of traditional metaphysical reasoning in the subject-object scheme. Simply: the World as a pure object no longer makes sense to us, since by our creativity physically and ideally we participate in it, we are its integral part. Thus the subject-object formula de facto turns out to be in a sense “a heresy”.

In order for the cult of science, which is so characteristic of our time, to have any meaning at all, it should be reflected at the level of technical, scientific
education that science is not only an instrument for dealing with nature, with the world, but also a certain self-understanding and relationship of the human Dasein to itself (Fink, 1974, p. 8). This is what Nietzsche also pointed out, that modern mathematical science nevertheless brought with it a fundamental educational challenge, as the World suddenly opened up to man and he has been rolling ever since into the unknown x (Nietzsche, 1988d, p. 127), without learning, brought up to perceive the naturalness of this state. Without the cosmological orientation of the philosophy of education, a person easily falls into a blind faith in science, because he uses it as an ideological substitute for the metaphysical relation to the world that has been lost and which provided him with subject-object coordinates, with a value orientation that clearly spoke of the fact that the spirit is ontologically more than matter, and thus man also acquired an imaginary fixed place in the cosmos.

But if the relationship to the World – in the Finkian and Nietzschean sense – was a natural part of the philosophy of education, then our relationship to science and technology might look a little different, less like consumerist idolatry. According to Fink, the cosmological philosophy of education brings the necessary perception of the internal interrelation of the question of freedom, human creativity and the problem of technology, which has the potential to break the last ontological prejudice about the superiority of purely mental activity, production, in general, reason over sensory production, over matter. At first glance, this sounds too “philosophical”, but here it is about breaking the “habit” or inherited prejudice about the so-called hierarchy of being – that things earthly, tangible, as well as every non-human being, have a “lower” ontological value (because only reason, spirituality is supposed to be a putative symptom of the so-called higher being), and therefore can be simply – manipulated, used and even destroyed. However, we can see for ourselves where our short-sighted market education has led us (and continues to lead us) – to the devastation of our own environment, but also of human dignity, which in this perverse context begins and ends with the economic relevance of man being used to the maximum as a human resource; a resource alongside other natural resources. And just as the world itself is subject to us, so we also bring this understanding into interpersonal relationships, which, in conjunction with the potential of technology, is a guarantee of the progressive decline of civilisation as we know it.

\[11\text{ In this lies the cruel joy of science, about which Nietzsche was writing. Our task is to deal with this fact, to educate ourselves not to die of this truth...}\]
References


