Selecting Virtues: Philia and Relational Flourishing
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.8.1.6037Keywords:
eudaimonia, relational flourishing, philia, virtue ethics, HursthouseAbstract
This paper has a threefold aim. First, it seeks to unveil the circularity in Hursthouse’s account of Eudaimonist Virtue Ethics (EVE). To this end, I show that by framing eudaimonia as acting virtuously and virtues as stable dispositions of character needed to flourish, Hursthouse ultimately commits to a circular movement, where each concept is defined in terms of the other. In particular, virtues are not only seen as conducive to flourishing but also normatively constitutive of eudaimonia. I then demonstrate this circularity in action by discussing Rosalind McDougall’s application of EVE to reproductive ethics, particularly with respect to parents selecting for a deaf child. Second, I argue that this circularity stems from an individualistic conception of flourishing, which is rooted in a phenomenological interpretation of zoon politikon, leaving no intermediate space between means (i.e., virtues) and the end (i.e., eudaimonia). Third, I propose a relational conception of eudaimonia, defining it as acting virtuously with and for others. I further contend that the normative structure of philia can lead to a linear relationship between virtues and flourishing, providing an intermediate selection criterion for virtues.
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