Each to Their Own: Can the Capability Approach be Legitimate and Justified?

Abstract

In this paper I will address some problems associated with how we select a list of capabilities that are suitable for a conception of justice. Broadly speaking there are two methods for selecting a list of capabilities. The first is the subjective approach discussed by Sen. This approach argues that what is on the list is a matter for people to decide for themselves. The second is the objective approach endorsed by Martha Nussbaum and Elizabeth Anderson, which claims that there is an objective list of capabilities that constitute a good life for people. Neither approach seems entirely satisfactory. The problems facing either version of the capability approach are equally severe in their own way. I will suggest a framework for how we can solve the “selection problem”. I will claim that we should understand this problem in terms of the employment of two distinct but related concepts: justification and legitimacy. I will present an approach to selecting capabilities that argues that they need to be both legitimate (endorsed) and justified (morally acceptable). I will also argue that the incorporation of important functions into the metric is required for the metric to be plausible as a public principle of justice.