Non-identity and Collective Responsibility for Past Harms

Abstract

Axel Gosseries, in his What is intergenerational justice?, claims that no harm can be caused to future individuals because of the non-identity problem. He does not refer to possible harm to groups, but, supporting an individualistic stance, he seems to imply that groups are mere aggregates of individuals. If he claims that no harm can be caused to future individuals, it can be concluded that he would also deny possible harm to groups. Drawing on contemporary debates on individualism and holism and the continuity of nations, this paper shows that nations are real, independent and long-lived entities, and that harm can be caused to such groups, without influencing the identities of their future members. This paper also challenges the reliance on the non-identity problem to deny moral obligations to compensate. In some cases, where one long-living group harms another, there might arise a moral duty to compensate.