Ethics, Politics & Society

Marx and the Missing Theory of Ideology

Peter Baumann — Fri, 10 Oct 2025 00:00:00 +0000

Karl Marx is often and typically seen as one of the main theorists of ideology. However, a closer look shows that Marx does not offer anything like a developed theory of ideology. Rather, there are, as I argue here, elements for 3 quite different accounts of ideology to be found in his work: ideology as superstructure, as the rulers’ ruling ideas, and as false consciousness. This is a new reconstruction of Marx’ ideas about ideology. None of the above 3 ideas has been developed in any greater detail by Marx, and there is even the open question whether they are mutually compatible. There might be some hope to combine the second and the third idea but I argue that anyone interested in a theory of ideology should rather look into more recent developments. It turns out that such a theory is still very much in its ‘infancy’.

Selecting Virtues: Philia and Relational Flourishing

Enea Lombardi — Fri, 10 Oct 2025 00:00:00 +0000

This paper has a threefold aim. First, it seeks to unveil the circularity in Hursthouse’s account of Eudaimonist Virtue Ethics (EVE). To this end, I show that by framing eudaimonia as acting virtuously and virtues as stable dispositions of character needed to flourish, Hursthouse ultimately commits to a circular movement, where each concept is defined in terms of the other. In particular, virtues are not only seen as conducive to flourishing but also normatively constitutive of eudaimonia. I then demonstrate this circularity in action by discussing Rosalind McDougall’s application of EVE to reproductive ethics, particularly with respect to parents selecting for a deaf child. Second, I argue that this circularity stems from an individualistic conception of flourishing, which is rooted in a phenomenological interpretation of zoon politikon, leaving no intermediate space between means (i.e., virtues) and the end (i.e., eudaimonia). Third, I propose a relational conception of eudaimonia, defining it as acting virtuously with and for others. I further contend that the normative structure of philia can lead to a linear relationship between virtues and flourishing, providing an intermediate selection criterion for virtues.

Intergenerational Justice through the Rejection of Western Heritage

Matteo Pietropaoli — Fri, 10 Oct 2025 00:00:00 +0000

This work intends to address the issue of intergenerational and climate justice in the context of a possible rejection, mainly at a socio-cultural level, of the Western heritage. Starting from the reflections on the theme of the Anthropocene and of a new conception of human responsibility, different from that primarily linked to individual freedom, here we propose to analyze three aspects of this possible rejection, which together can contribute to fostering the mitigation of climate change and a livable future for the new generations. The first aspect is cultural transition from post-materialistic to materialistic values, The second one concerns the issue of contrasting overpopulation, and the third one, to be pursued jointly with the others, is that of “degrowth”, above all in terms of consumption. All these aspects, which must be fostered both on a cultural and institutional level, make up a process that we consider to be already underway and which we believe will allow a sort of intergenerational justice and a planetary future far from the most extreme consequences for humanity, from lack of livability to extinction.

Who Owns Renewable Energy? The Advantages of Aristotelian-Influenced Ownership

Paul Fagan — Fri, 10 Oct 2025 00:00:00 +0000

As renewable energy becomes increasingly important, we may ask philosophical questions such as who owns renewable energy? Due to renewable energy’s widespread nature and its potential for domestic harnessing, it suits an Aristotelian-influenced ownership type where the energy is largely harnessed by individual, self-reliant households. Such an ownership type also is advantageous, in that it would encourage sustainability, support the rights of small groups and provide a form of social justice. Hence, it offers a route for developing future energy policy, and may be favoured by societies largely composed of self-contained homes but could also cater for small communities.

The Moral Status of Institutional Negligence

Anandita Mukherji — Fri, 10 Oct 2025 00:00:00 +0000

The moral status of negligent actions presents a unique quandary because these actions are prima facie unintentional, but preventable with due care. Legally culpable negligent acts occur without malicious intent but result in harm, and the agent owed care to the victim, but failed to act with the appropriate care due. In this essay, I argue that the moral status of negligent actions varies depending on whether the agent is an individual, or an organization or institution. I contend that while negligence is often only minimally morally blameworthy for individual agents, it is significantly more blameworthy for an organization or institution. As agents, institutions are different in kind from individuals, partly due to their superior capacities, which give them the ability to shape their own character, and therefore the moral fault of their vices that lead to culpably negligent actions are morally weightier than those of individuals.