Selecting Virtues: Philia and Relational Flourishing
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.8.1.6037Palavras-chave:
eudaimonia, relational flourishing, philia, virtue ethics, HursthouseResumo
Este artigo possui um duplo objetivo. Primeiro, desvelar a circularidade presente na abordagem de Rosalind Hursthouse sobre a ética das virtudes eudaimonista. Para isso, demonstrarei que, ao definir a eudaimonia como agir virtuosamente e as virtudes como disposições de caráter estáveis necessárias para florescer, Hursthouse acaba comprometendo-se com um movimento circular, em que cada um dos conceitos é definido em termos do outro. Argumentarei que essa limitação pode ser atribuída a uma concepção individualista de florescimento, derivada de uma interpretação fenomenológica do zōon politikón, que não deixa espaço intermediário entre os meios e o fim. Em segundo lugar, defenderei uma concepção relacional de eudaimonia, que a define como agir virtuosamente com e para os outros. Sustentarei, ainda, que a estrutura normativa da philia pode estabelecer uma relação linear entre virtudes e florescimento, fornecendo um critério intermediário para a seleção das virtudes.
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