Mapping the south European ideological space: the impact of globalization on party discourse in Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain

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ABSTRACT:
The purpose of this paper is to offer a comprehensive account of the structure of ideological space in Southern Europe and contribute to the ongoing discussion concerning the impact of globalization on the domestic politics of European countries. We analyze party manifests from European elections in Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal using multidimensional scaling. Even though our findings largely support the hypothesis that components of the globalization divide tend to transform the content of the traditional cultural-political dimension, we observe that this transformation occurs in different ways across national contexts.

KEYWORDS:
European Union; ideological space; globalization; Southern Europe

The purpose of this paper is twofold: a) to offer a diachronic descriptive account of the ideological space in the ‘Old Southern Europe’ (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain) and b) to test the hypothesis about the (re)structuring impact of globalization on national ideological spaces in Europe (Kriesi et al. 2006; 2008a) with a focus on the south European subregion. Even though recent comparative and single-case studies have attempted to examine and interpret the stances of political elites and/or public opinion in Southern Europe towards particular aspects of globalization and European integration (e.g. Freire 2012; Conti, Cotta and de Almeida 2010; Lobo and Magalhães 2009; Quaglia 2009), this is the first attempt – to our knowledge – to comprehensively map the ideological space in Southern Europe. This allows us not only to gauge where political parties stand on issues related to globalization and European integration, but also to explore the ways in which a new globalization-induced divide aligns (where it exists) with more traditional political divisions.

The Structure of Ideological Space: Old and New Conflicts

The assumption of multidimensionality of ideological space in contemporary European politics has become commonplace in recent decades, especially since the publication of Lipset and Rockan’s (1967) classic work on cleavages which, as is well known, identified four main dimensions of societal conflict in West European societies that, in turn, gave rise to political parties with particularistic policy agendas. However, the identification of structural transformations in western societies has prompted new analyses of the major divisions in contemporary political systems. Technological changes, the reorganization of economic production and the increased significance of the ever expanding middle class have supposedly dulled the classic capital-labor conflict. In addition, economic growth, increased affluence levels and the rapid expansion of education have created a secularizing dynamic and a purported generational value shift (Inglehart 1977). Hypotheses that new cleavages are gradually replacing older ones, or that simply traditional cleavages are in decline (e.g. Franklin, Mackie and Valen 1992), abound in the relevant literature. The new divisions might reflect new objective structural conflicts (e.g. divergence of interests between different segments of the middle class) or the emergence of value conflicts that are completely free from any structural anchoring. However, the implicit or explicit assumption that informs most similar studies on the structure of ideological space is that all conflicts, old and new, can be captured in two broad dimensions: a conflict over distributional preferences...
and the economic role of government, reflecting a divergence of objective material interests; and a cultural dimension formed by fundamental value divides. What differs from study to study is the identification of the specific content of these two dimensions and their respective alignment onto the two-dimensional space.

For example, Herbert Kitschelt (1994) has argued that socio-economic changes during the 1970s and 1980s have rotated the main axis of ideological demand and, consequently, of political supply in Western Europe, from a simple dilemma between 'left-socialist' and 'right-capitalist' (i.e. exclusively economic-distributive) alternatives, to a more complex contraposition between 'left-libertarian' and 'right-authoritarian' poles. In more recent treatments, Hanspeter Kriesi and his colleagues (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008a; Lachat and Kriesi 2008) have amended Kitschelt's schema by tracing a third pole of 'right-libertarians' at the upper-right corner of the two-dimensional space. This tripolar schema is more or less attributed to the emergence of a new value conflict that transforms the content of the vertical cultural axis, and which Kriesi calls the 'integration-demarcation' divide, associated with the different facets of globalization and regional integration. This conflict supposedly results in a split-up of the 'right-wing' camp between a 'culturally liberal, cosmopolitan right' and an 'authoritarian, nationalist right'. Following this line of reasoning, we investigate the thesis about the (re)structuring impact of the politicization of issues pertaining to more integration and the ensuing polarization dynamic within (specifically) Southern European political systems, a region of Europe that has received relatively scant attention in previous relevant studies.

The Political Impact of Globalization on the EU’s Southern Periphery

Our choice to investigate the applicability of this thesis in the case of the countries of Southern Europe begs the question: why would we expect these four countries to be any different? Previous studies have shown that globalization does indeed have a discernible impact on the structure of the ideological space in Western Europe at the levels of political elites as well as public opinion (in addition to Kriesi’s work, see van der Brug and van Spanje 2009; Bornschier 2010). Apart from numerically amplifying the empirical scope of this theoretical perspective, we contend that the focus on Southern Europe is interesting in additional ways. On the one hand, evidence from public opinion surveys and studies of political elites (e.g. Conti, Cotta and de Almeida 2010; Llamazares and Gramacho 2007) usually confirm that Southern Europe is a generally pro-European region, meaning that
the themes of economic and political regional integration have not proven thus far
to be particularly divisive, despite the growing politicization of grievances toward
the EU, particularly from smaller parties of the left or the right. On the other,
the broadly shared trajectory of economic development in Southern Europe and
the resulting similarities in the composition of the national economic structures
have had important repercussions in the formulation of policy orientations for
political actors in the region. Even though the classic left-right dimension has
emerged as an important signifier for the construction of political identities in
the region in the post-war and post-authoritarian periods, it has been suggested
that the content of the dimension is arguably determined more by value-based
polarities and less by economic ideology (and the standard capital-labor conflict)
in comparison to other European countries. The argument goes that the legacy of
paternalist states, the large size of the agricultural sector, the existence of small
and relatively unorganised working classes, and the persisting size and influence
of the ‘traditional middle strata’ – with the partial exceptions of northern Italy
and northeastern Spain – has meant that it has been less politically expedient
for parties to espouse economically liberal positions (regardless of actual poli-
cies pursued when in power) due to the relative absence of a sizeable receptive
audience in the region (Tsatsas 2009, 209-210). The finding that distributional
issues figure less prominently in understandings of the left-right dichotomy in
Southern Europe, does not mean that left and right do not function as important
cognitive shortcuts in the categorization of political parties, policy preferences
and political identities. However, it can mean that the distinction between left
and right – understood strictly in terms of its standard association with the class
conflict and distributional politics (Mair 2007, 213) – does not have the same
structuring impact on the South European ideological space when compared to
other European democracies.

An additional element that sets Southern Europe apart is that, especially during
and after the transition to democracy, economic policy preferences have been linked
(in political party discourse at least) not necessarily to standard economic ideolo-
gies but to the broader project of ‘modernization’, which has not only economic
but also political and cultural aspects. Accession into the EU, the full entry into
the globalised economy and the ensuing challenge to ‘catch-up’ with the rest of
Europe, produces differentiations between actors which are more open to change
(‘reformers’) and those which are more resistant (‘traditionalists’). Globalization
and Europeanisation create and reinforce domestic cleavages based on compet-
ing notions of reform, economic interest and identity. Change and continuity are juxtaposed as domestic fault lines across the domestic system (Featherstone and Kazamias 2000, 13). In other words, the ‘universal’ integration-demarcation dichotomy had an early regional expression in the contrast between modernization and traditionalism.

The main research hypothesis tested in this paper is that the integration-demarcation dichotomy – which encapsulates issues as seemingly disparate as the strengthening of EU institutions and perceived challenges to national sovereignty, attitudes towards immigrants and the perceived erosion of national identity, as well as market integration and trade liberalization – will have a more potent structuring effect on the ideological space in Southern Europe than the left-right materialist dimension. In addition, we expect that the ‘globalization’ dimension will tend to be aligned with the traditional cultural dimension within the ideological space and, thus, maintain an orthogonal position in relation to the left-right axis. We hold the same expectation for the economic dimension of globalization and, for this reason, we have conceptualized and operationalized distinct categories for economic integration and economic liberalism, even though the two are often conceptually and operationally collapsed (as in the work by Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008a). We argue that the economic integration category is fundamentally a boundary issue, not unlike the cultural and political components of the globalization divide, and that orientations in favor or against it ultimately stem from ideological predispositions on the problem of community demarcation.

We test this hypothesis by examining the programmatic commitments of political parties from the ‘Old Southern Europe’ (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain) as expressed in their European election manifestos, based on data from the Euro-manifestos and PIREDEU projects. In the following section we present in detail our research strategy and design and we focus the discussion on the operationalization of our main ideological categories and the selected method of analysis.

**Data and Methods**

The empirical research strategy of the paper focuses on two main objectives. The first and overarching one is to examine the structure of the ideological space of different party systems and, subsequently, the position of globalization-related issues within this space. In addition, we attempt to locate the exact position of all relevant political parties within national ideological spaces in Southern Europe.
by examining the proximity between political parties and particular ideological categories.

Because our analysis focuses exclusively on the supply-side of party competition, the first and most important step of our research design was to make an appropriate choice of data in order to estimate the policy positions of political actors in accordance with our research questions and with data availability. We use the database of the 'Euromanifesto Project' (EMP) at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES) for the time period of 1994-2004; for the Euromanifestos of 2009, the available database of the 'Manifesto Study 2009' of the 'PIREDEU Project' is analyzed. The 15-year time frame (1994-2009) employed in the study reflects the effort to balance the issue of data availability with optimal comparability. Even though the Euromanifesto Project covers all EP elections, we only select those years for which there are coded Euromanifestos for (at least) all major parties. Following this criterion, we include the last four EP elections for which we have data for all four countries, with the exception of Greece in 1994 (due to lack of data for any right-of-centre parties). For the criterion of party relevance for the inclusion of a political party in our analysis, we have decided to follow the standard practice of equating relevance with the securing of representation in the corresponding representative institution after a given election.

Operationalisation of Ideological Categories

The scores in the Euromanifestos dataset represent percentages of political arguments (quasi-sentences) related to particular issues within each manifesto. Because of differences in the length of the documents, the number of quasi-sentences in each category is standardized in order to make coded manifestos comparable. We have selected only a subgroup of categories for our analysis, which are then regrouped into nine distinct categories that denote more abstract ideological orientations: economic liberalism, welfare state economy, fiscal conservatism, cultural liberalism, sociopolitical authoritarianism, environmentalism, economic integration, Euroscepticism, and nativism. We have also created a tenth ideological category, decentralization, which we have employed only in the study of Spain intending to capture the 'center-periphery' cleavage that has dominated Spanish politics throughout the country's history.

The particular issues and the broader ideological categories were selected in an attempt to satisfy two main criteria: a) ideological clarity, in terms of selecting
categories of issues that correspond more clearly to the two main dimensions of political competition as identified in the opening part of the paper (socio-economic and cultural-political), plus the globalization-antiglobalization axis that constitutes the focus of our study; b) conceptual congruence, in terms of striking the best possible balance between more abstract ideological categories (e.g. economic liberalism) and concrete policy issues (e.g. privatization). We achieved the latter by selecting issues with detailed definitions (in the Euromanifestos codebook) that were unambiguously associated with one of our ten categories. Some issues were excluded due to the fact that components of their definitions had no direct relevance with our strictly defined ideological category, even in cases where the title of the issue-category at first appeared relevant. We decided, at this stage, against pursuing a more inductive approach in order to avoid greater conceptual stretching and lower content validity for our composite categories (cf. Ray 2007, 12; Keman 2007, 78).

As mentioned above, following our first criterion we have created categories that correspond to the two classic dimensions related to the broader economic and cultural dimensions, plus the ‘integration-demarcation’ dimension: a) economic liberalism, welfare state economy and fiscal conservatism correspond to the broad economic dimension; b) cultural liberalism, authoritarianism, environmentalism, decentralization (only for Spain) correspond to the cultural dimension, which includes the ‘new politics’ dimension, and c) economic integration, Euroscepticism, nativism capture the economic, political and cultural dimension of the integration-demarcation axis.

The ten ideological categories are defined in such a way that they indicate clear directionality. More specifically, we have distinguished between positive and negative references for all the selected issues. It should be noted that a major benefit of using the dataset of the Euromanifestos Project, in comparison to the MRG/CMP, is that the direction of parties’ statements is documented in most of its categories. Table 1 lists and describes in detail the ten ideological categories, including the particular issues that form the components of each category. The ideological categories are computed by summing up all the positive references and subtracting the negative ones. We have applied this formula to all the relevant parties of each country and for each EP election.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideological categories/Abbreviations</th>
<th>Issues used for calculation of ideological category scores (positive minus negative quasi-sentences)</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmentalism environment</td>
<td>Environmental protection; anti-growth politics; steady state economy; ecologism; 'Green Politics'</td>
<td>Any opposite mentions of positive</td>
<td>Favourable references to Europe or the EU; &quot;deepening of Europe&quot; necessary; a more integrated Europe and the transfer of power to EU is rejected; hostile reference to the European Parliament and its MEPs, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and other EU institutions; required unanimity in the European Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Euro-scepticism euscept</td>
<td>Hostile references to Europe or the EU; no &quot;deepening of Europe&quot; necessary; a more integrated Europe and the transfer of power to EU is rejected; hostile reference to the European Parliament and its MEPs, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and other EU institutions; required unanimity in the European Council</td>
<td>Favourable references to Europe or the EU; &quot;deepening of Europe&quot; necessary; a more integrated Europe and the transfer of power to EU is supported; desirability of expanding the competences of EU institutions; positive reference to EU institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Liberalism cullib</td>
<td>Opposition to traditional moral values; support for divorce, abortion etc.; favorable mentions, support or assistance for homosexuals and women; any other mentions opposite of negative</td>
<td>Favorable references to traditional moral values; prohibition, censorship and suppression of immorality stability of family; religion; negative references to homosexuals and women.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Integration econintgr</td>
<td>Favorable references to or support for the Single European Market and the European Monetary Union; favorable reference to labor migration and support for the concept of free trade; support or accept national contributions to finance the EU or its policies; maintain or extend EU funds for structurally underdeveloped areas</td>
<td>Negative references to or rejection of the Single European Market and the European Monetary Union; negative reference to labor migration and positive mentions to protect internal markets; national contributions to finance the EU or its policies are criticised or rejected</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Liberalism econlib</td>
<td>Favourable references to free enterprise; need for wage and tax policies to induce enterprise, privatisation*; negative reference to corporatism; direct government control of economy; social ownership*; publicly-owned industry*; socialist property*; nationalisation, market regulation, Marxist analysis</td>
<td>Any opposite mentions of positive; positive references to: corporatism; direct government control of economy; social ownership*; publicly-owned industry*; socialist property*; nationalisation, market regulation, Marxist analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiscal conservatism</td>
<td>Need for traditional economic orthodoxy; e.g. reduction of budget deficits, support for strong currency; positive references to the European Central Bank</td>
<td>Keynesian demand management; demand-oriented economic policy; devoted to the reduction of depression and/or to increase private demand etc; any negative references to economic orthodoxy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nativism</td>
<td>Enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration; any appeals to patriotism and/or nationalism; need to reduce immigration; negative references to or no support for immigrants and foreigners</td>
<td>Cultural diversity; communalism; preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages; positive references to and support for immigrants and foreigners</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sociopolitical</td>
<td>Enforcement of all laws; actions against crime; support and resources for police; fight against terrorism*; need to maintain or increase military expenditure</td>
<td>Favorable reference to decreasing military expenditures; disarmament; favorable reference to importance of human and civil rights; freedom of speech</td>
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<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Welfare State</td>
<td>Need to introduce, maintain or expand any social service or social security scheme; the concept of equality; special protection for underprivileged; references to labor groups; specific measures for supporting the expansion of the welfare state (pensions, health care and nursing service, social housing, child care)</td>
<td>Limiting expenditure on social services or social security; proposal to cutback or suspend specific measures for supporting the expansion of the welfare state</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decentralization**</td>
<td>Favorable references to national autonomy on the European level for policy, economy, and administration; support for keeping up local and regional customs; favorable mentions of special consideration for local areas; deference to local expertise</td>
<td>Opposition to political decision-making at lower political levels; support for more centralization in political and administrative procedures</td>
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<td>decenter</td>
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* only for 2004 and 2009 Euromanifestos

** only for Spain

**Method of Analysis**

We selected multidimensional unfolding (MDU) as our main method of analysis due to the appropriateness of the method when trying to represent the relative positioning of ideological categories and parties in a low-dimensional space. The
capacity to locate political parties and specific ideological categories within a common space allows us to compare parties and party systems both cross-nationally and over time. Perhaps most importantly, the visualization of the structure of the ideological space and the place of parties within it produces easily interpretable findings. MDU can be seen as a special case of multidimensional scaling (MDS), where the within-sets proximities are missing (Borg and Groenen 2005, 293) – in our case proximities between parties and between ideological categories respectively. Instead, our data represent only between-sets proximities, that is proximities between parties and ideological categories.

MDU is best applied when the data constitute preference scores (such as rank-orders of preference) of different individuals (or, in our case, political parties) for a set of choice objects (in our case, ideological categories) (Borg and Groenen 2005, 293). Therefore, based on the scores that we obtained on each of our ideological categories for each party, we have ranked ideological preferences for each of our parties in each separate election, in order to obtain the initial unweighted proximities between parties and ideological categories. In order to account not only for the similarities between pairs of objects (parties and ideological categories), but also for the salience of these relationships, we have used the measure of this salience (i.e. the frequency of the entire set of quasi-sentences used per ideological category by each political party) as a weight that adjusts the original proximity between party and ideological category. As a result, the distances on the joint space corresponding to salient relationships between parties and ideological categories will be more accurate than the less salient ones (cf. Dolezal 2008, 72).

Even though all our unfolding solutions are completed for a two-dimensional space following our main hypotheses, we do not simply assume that the optimal dimensionality of the ideological space will be the same for every single election. We run each unfolding model for different number of dimensions and use badness-of-fit values (Kruskal’s Stress-1) to gauge the optimal dimensionality of the unfolding model.

Findings

For presentation purposes, we have rotated the two-dimensional plots in a way that the economic axis is arranged horizontally, always running from left to right (welfare state economy to economic liberalism). Following the presentational strategy employed by Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008a), we have drawn an additional vertical or
near-vertical axis on each plot based on our visual representation of the second dimension structuring the ideological space. The categories forming the cultural axis can change from one election to the next, and so does the degree of integration between the two axes. Specifically, the strategy for drawing the vertical unbroken lines relies on the selection of those ideological categories that best capture the dispersion of political parties based on the criterion of proximity of political parties and ideological categories. In other words, of all possible lines that can be drawn connecting non-economic ideological categories (that are supposed to represent the cultural axis), we select the one that appears to provide the best fit with the location of the political parties. At this point, we should once again point out that the distances between parties and ideological categories represent relative distances. In other words, we can only say that a party adopts culturally liberal positions only if it is located very close to that category, not necessarily because it is located in the upper end of the configuration (cf. Dolezal 2008, 73).

*Italy (1994-2009)*

The fact that our analysis begins in 1994 means that we are dealing with a radically new party system. Even though the Italian party system is the newest of all four (newer than the three late democratizers), the new configuration quickly developed a bipolar structure which maintains to this day. As is well known, the party system that collapsed was dominated by the Christian Democratic Party (DC). After forty years of continuing presence in successive coalition governments, the DC became the main cog in a machinery of systemic corruption. Following the Tangentopoli affair, the DC fragmented into different parties and groupings. The neo-fascist MSI seized the political opportunity of the dissolution of the DC and its own strong performance in the local elections of 1993 and re-baptized itself as the National Alliance (AN) under the leadership of the party’s secretary, Gianfranco Fini. The dissolution of DC, the formation of Forza Italia (FI) by Silvio Berlusconi, and the ‘refoundation’ of the Communist Party as the (more legitimate) Party of the Democratic Left (PDS) formed the main components for the creation of two coalition camps, led by FI and PDS respectively, that put an end to the one-party dominant system of the post-war era and inaugurated an era of multi-party bipolar politics.

Even though the post-war Italian party system was marked by a dual cleavage structure where class and religion predominated (Bellucci & Heath 2007, 5), partisan dealignment and organizational fluidity accelerated after the early
1990s political 'earthquake', making it extremely difficult to detect changes and continuity in parties' positions. The first thing that should be noted about the unfolding models of the Italian EP elections is that they render acceptable fits for all two-dimensional solutions (raw stress values around or below 0.20), which means that the ideological space in Italy retained a basically dual structure. In the 1994 EP election, what emerges is a picture of relative moderation along all relevant vectors. There is some differentiation along the left-right materialist dimension, with Lega Nord (LN) adopting the most rightward position, whereas the new Forza Italia (FI), Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and the Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI) adopt more centrist stances, blending pro-welfare with economically liberal positions. The Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) and Communist Refoundation (RC) emerge as more leftwing parties that favor pro-welfare positions and oppose economically liberal orientations. The vertical axis is clearly structured by globalization-related issues, with PDS and FI closest to the pro-integration end of the spectrum, whereas AN and LN position themselves closer to the nativism end. The only outlier, RC, emerge as the main Eurosceptic party.

In subsequent elections, there is a trend toward moderation in economic issues while economic integration and nativism continue to structure the vertical axis, with the exception of 2004, more traditional cultural categories (cultural liberalism vs. authoritarianism) provide the content of the second dimension. FI makes a noteworthy move by placing more emphasis on economically liberal positions in 1999 and 2004, but moves back into a more moderate position in the 2009 EP election after its merger with AN into the People of Freedom (PdL). The PDS (in 2004 examined only as part of the Ulivo coalition due to the unavailability of separate manifestos, and in 2009 competing as Democratic Party- PD following its merger with La Margherita) oscillates between centrist and leftist economic positions, reflecting its many changes in leadership and programmatic identity. However, it maintains relatively consistent pro-integration positions on the vertical axis, whereas FI/PdL displays another gradual transition toward pro-demarcation stances. AN constitutes the most consistent anti-integration political force in Italy and its impact on Berlusconi's FI becomes clear after their merger and creation of PdL. Surprisingly, LN displays less consistent positions on the integration-demarcation dimension, positioning itself closer to traditional conservative positions (authoritarianism), and only in the last EP election there is a clear move toward nativism, but not euroscepticism as documented in previous studies (e.g. Quaglia 2009, 13). Overall, both the left-right materialist and the integration-demarcation
dimensions display equally potent structuring effects on the Italian ideological space. Nevertheless, one can detect a subtle gradual trend of moderation along the left-right materialist axis coupled with the steady (and perhaps growing) polarization along the integration-demarcation axis, but also with a growing degree of integration between the two axes, especially evident in the EP election of 2009. The latter observation perhaps means that Italy is moving from a two-dimensional ideological space with a tripolar or quadripolar structure towards a unidimensional space, which would also better mirror the bipolar structure of Italian party alliances.


Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.20
Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.21

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.21
Greece (1999-2009)

Even though the party system of Greece is relatively new, created after the return to democracy in 1974, memories of the political divisions of the pre-authoritarian period continued to condition the understanding of Greek politics and to shape political identities long after regime transition. It has been argued that Greek political space has been characterized by a three-pronged (left-center-right) unidimensional structure and a single cleavage, with its exact point of division along the single axis shifting according to the historical juncture (Lyrintzis 2005, 244). The post-German occupation civil war created a schism between communists vs.
anticommunists that replaced the dominant interwar division of republicans vs. royalists (or Venizelists vs. Anti-Venizelists), thus shifting the line of separation towards the left end of the left-right axis. The protracted monopolization and abuse of political power by conservative political forces eventually shifted the line of separation back toward the right end of the political spectrum through the emergence of a right-extremist cleavage in the 1960s, with the antiright bloc encompassing both forces of the left and of the political center (Moschonas 1994, 167-170).

Most of the parties that appeared after the end of the colonels' regime in 1974 were new but with clearly discernible ties to pre-authoritarian political life. After the first two elections of the post-authoritarian period in the 1970s, which were characterized by a relatively high degree of fluidity, the Greek party system was dominated once again by three blocs (left-center-left-center-right) (Lyrantzis 2005, 244) but started to develop even stronger majoritarian tendencies. The shift of the ideological equilibrium to the left of the spectrum that lasted at least until the 1990s, can be attributed to a relative radicalization of the Greek electorate generated by the seven-year experience of right-wing authoritarianism. In the 1980s there was a swift move towards two-partyism, with the party of the center-left (PASOK) and the party of the center-right (New Democracy) regularly capturing over 80% of the vote in parliamentary elections. The third bloc, consisting of a united or (more commonly) fragmented communist left continued to struggle, with an electoral strength that hovered around 10% of the vote and seats in parliament, a tendency that persists to this day.

Despite the seemingly straightforward intelligibility of the unidimensional left-right space, in Greece, as in the rest of Southern Europe, the content of this dimension never quite corresponded to its classic definition and understanding. Even though political divisions in Greece forged resilient identities, they never amounted to full cleavages – in the strict sense – due to the exceptionally weak structural anchoring of both political identities and voting choices. Our findings indicate that even though the Greek political space is two-dimensional and not unidimensional, party positions on cultural issues form a clearer structuring dimension of the ideological space in relation to the left-right materialist one. In other words, polarization along the cultural axis appears to be significantly more acute than polarization along the left-right materialist axis. In every election, welfare state economy emerges as a valence issue for all parties, with the exception of the conservative New Democracy party (ND) in 1999, which espouses untypically liberal,
economically, positions and right-wing populist LAOS in 2009, which becomes an outlier party in economic policy terms.

Another important observation relates to the alignment between the 'new politics' category (environmentalism) and welfare state economy, meaning that the 'new politics' and the left-right materialist axis overlap simplifying the ideological space. Thus, as reflected in the low raw stress scores for the two-dimensional configurations, Greece might have developed a more complicated structure than the unidimensional one that had been identified in past decades (see discussion above), but probably one does not need to go beyond two dimensions to capture the complexity of contemporary Greek politics.

Overall, the findings for Greece appear to confirm Kriesi's basic hypothesis: globalization-related issues generally tend to be aligned with and on occasion to substitute more traditional cultural issues. In addition, the low structuring impact of the left-right materialist axis confirms our 'Southern European' hypothesis concerning the higher polarizing potential of non-distributional issues. The proximity between nativism and euroscepticism, and their contribution to the content of the cultural-political axis in 1999 and 2004 can be explained by two factors. The first is that the Communist Party (KKE), the main representative of Euroscepticism in Greece, has moved towards culturally protectionist and anti-immigration positions since the early 1990s, reflecting a more general strategic choice to rely upon a more explicitly national-populist agenda. The second factor has been the advent of the right-wing populist party (LAOS) onto the political scene, which has increased the relevance of its flagship issues: immigration and protection of the national culture (the issues corresponding to the nativism category). Before the emergence of LAOS, the Greek ideological space displayed tendencies of inverse tripolarity (in relation to Kriesi's hypothesis). The integration-demarcation dimension contributed to a split for the parties at the left-end of the materialist continuum. The consolidation of the presence of LAOS and the creation of new parties in 2010 and 2011, coupled with the current sovereign debt crisis throughout the European periphery (and especially in Greece), is expected to lead to greater polarization along both axes and a quadri polar structure. Pro-integration and pro-demarcation orientations continue to supplement or even substitute classic value-based conflicts, while the earlier consensus on a state-driven model of economic development is being increasingly challenged by old and new political forces.

Kruskal’s Stress-1: 0.15
Kruskal’s Stress-I: 0.17

Ideological categories:
- Welfare-welfare state economy; econlib-economic liberalism; fiscalcon-fiscal conservatism; environment-environmentalism; cultlib-cultural liberalism; authoritarian-socio-political authoritarianism; nationalism-nationalism; econlib-economic integration; eurocepticism

Political parties:
- PASOK-Panhellenic Socialist Movement; NDs-New Democracy; SYRIZA-Syriza; KKE-Communist Party; LAOS-Popular Orthodox Rally; DIKKE-Democratic Social Movement

Portugal (1994-2009)

Portugal is the 'purest' late democratizer in the sense that prior to democratization in the mid-1970s, it was a long-established authoritarian regime in which political parties were not allowed and the population had virtually no exposure to party politics (Brunello 1997, 3). As a result, political awareness on the eve of the 1974 coup was very low and political elites had virtually no experience in democratic party politics. Our analysis of Portugal begins with the 1994 EP election, almost two decades after the fall of the Salazar/Caetano regime and less than a decade after the watershed national election of 1987, which effected a major realignment of the Portuguese electorate and led to the stabilization of the Portuguese party system after a transitional period characterized by high levels of electoral volatility.
The two-and-a-half party system that was consolidated during that period, with its four party format, developed the same tendencies toward two-partyism as in Greece, but the similarities do not end here as our findings reveal. As in Greece, the ideological space in Portugal, election after election appears to be tilted towards the left end of the spectrum. Welfare state economy often emerges as a valence category, and there is once again a consistent proximity between the latter category and environmentalism, reproducing the pattern of alignment between economically leftist and pro-environment positions. This is somewhat surprising given the legacy and deep-seated nature of class conflict in Portuguese history (Gunther and Montero 2001, 96). Not unlike Greece, however, a conflict over political values (in this case, regime-choice) emerged as the defining dimension at the crucial moment of mass political mobilization in Portuguese society (Jalali 2007, 51). The revolutionary nature of the coup had also an impact at the level of symbolism. In an effort to secure legitimacy during a transitory period largely controlled by the left-wing Armed Forces Movement and in a climate where right-of-centre political ideas were completely discredited, the new parties (even conservative ones) chose labels and symbols associated exclusively with socialism and social democracy. This legacy lived on even after the consolidation and normalization of the Portuguese party system, especially in regard to the economic discourse produced by all political parties. This symptom is reflected at the level of the electorate as well. In general, as other studies have systematically shown, Portugal exhibits low anchoring levels of the left-right divide in social structure, values and party identification (Freire and Belchior 2013; Freire and Belchior 2011).

Another similarity between Portugal and Greece has to do with the composition of the cultural axis, which displays a contribution by the three categories which constitute the integration-demarcation axis. Once again, the latter appear to produce more potent structuring effects on the ideological space in relation to the standard cultural categories. The EP election of 2004 is the only one that yields relatively more indeterminate results as to the composition of the vertical axis due to the combined contribution of all three globalization categories, in addition to fiscal conservatism. The contraposition between euroscepticism and nativism in 2009 appears a bit counterintuitive, but seems to follow a South European pattern where smaller leftist parties emerge as the primary representatives of Euroscepticism and economic protectionism (cf. Lobo and Magalhães 2009), while maintaining more ambivalent stances toward issues of cultural identity (even though KKE in Greece, as mentioned above, has recently opted for a more unambiguous cultural
protectionist stance). In some ways, the presence of unreformed communist parties in both Greece and Portugal produce effects on the ideological space comparable to the ones produced by right-wing populist parties in several western European party systems. One could say that the findings from both Greece and Portugal reveal a stronger influence of the integration-demarcation divide on the ideological space, and this can be attributed to two factors: a) the minor influence of the standard class cleavage in the two countries which led to a reinterpretation of the left-right materialist divide over cultural and political issues, and b) the presence of significant hardline communist parties, that combine nationalist, anti-integration and anti-systemic themes and, thus, endorse protectionist stances on a wide range of issues.


Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.16
Spain (1994-2009)

There is a near consensus in the literature on the Spanish party system that in the post-authoritarian period the left-right cleavage has been downplayed by political elites in a conscious effort to avoid reproducing the extremely polarizing climate of the Second Republic of the 1930s. The unique feature of the left-right dimension in pre-authoritarian Spain was that it contained a number of overlapping cleavages: class and religious cleavages coupled with a cleavage related to regime choice (monarchists vs. republicans). Due to the prolonged period of authoritarian rule, secondary associations emerged weakened during the phase of democratic consolidation (Gunther, Sanz, and Shahad 1986), allowing party elites to pursue a more consensual style of politics and to narrow the focus of their competition over the preferred road to modernization. After the decline of the party that managed the first transition years, the moderate Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD), the national party system that emerged was a two-and-a-half party system with
strong tendencies toward pure two-partyism. Since 1982, two major parties of the centre-left and centre-right, the Socialist Party (PSOE) and the People’s Alliance/People’s Party (AP/PP), have alternated in government, only occasionally having to resort to the formation of coalition governments with smaller parties. The only other steady fixture on the national scene has been the Communist Party (PCE), competing in elections under the banner of the permanent coalition United Left (IU) since 1986.

However, it would be wrong to talk about a single party system, and this marks another unique feature of the Spanish political scene after democratization. A nationwide party system coexists with regional party systems, courtesy of the emergence of a centre-periphery cleavage that was systematically suppressed but not eradicated by Franco’s authoritarian regime. Within each regional subsystem, a particular nationalist or regionalist party (or parties) plays a decisive role in local politics and electoral behavior (Linz and Montero 1999, 2). The exceptionalism of the Spanish case prompted us to include an additional ideological category (decentralization) in an attempt to capture the centre-periphery cleavage at the national stage. In order to depict in the best possible manner the impact of the center-periphery cleavage on Spanish ideological space, we have included in our analysis the two most influential and electorally successful regionalist parties: the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and the Catalan Convergence and Union (CiU).

Decentralization does indeed appear to have a significant structuring effect during the 1990s, in contrast to the 2000s, where the standard cultural categories (including the ‘new politics’ category) substitute decentralization as the important structuring categories of the vertical axis. In 1994, the left-right materialist axis accounts for most of the variation in the positions of parties and there are strong tendencies towards unidimensionality for the overall configuration (raw stress value for the one-dimensional solution at 0.18). This finding is in line with findings from previous studies that detect a strategic politicization of economic issues in the rhetoric of the two major political parties during the mid-1990s (e.g. Chhibber and Torcal 1997). However, this repoliticization of left-right politics, at least in relation to the economic agendas of parties appears to be short-lived. From 1999 onwards, the positioning of parties along the left-right materialist axis mirrors the pattern observed in other Southern European party systems, namely the relative rejection of economic liberalism by all political parties.

Even though the left-right materialist axis displays the same diminishing importance in terms of its structuring effect on the ideological space, Spain is perhaps
the only country in Southern Europe that appears to remain immune to the fragmentary effects of globalization. The vertical axis almost always accounts for most variation in the position of parties (with the exception of 1994 as mentioned before), but the integration-demarcation categories never enter the picture as important issues of contention. This can be attributed to several factors depending on the interpretation of the findings. One pattern that becomes instantly clear is that all parties stay clear from the euroscepticism and nativism categories, confirming the pro-European and pro-integration stances of political elites in Spain. The absence of an unreformed Communist party (as in Portugal and Greece), could partially account for this observation, as does the absence of a right-wing populist party (as in Italy and Greece). Another important observation relates to the consistently moderate positions adopted by the two regionalist parties, CIU and PNV, even during the 1990s when decentralization contributed to the formation of the vertical axis. Indeed, the most ‘extreme’ positions are systematically adopted by PP on the cultural-political axis due to its consistent proximity to authoritarianism, a fact which partially explains why the standard cultural categories prove to be far more important in the structuring of the second dimension compared to the ones related to globalization and Europeanization.


Kruskal’s Stress-1: 0.16
Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have tried to investigate the impact of globalization on domestic politics for the countries of 'Old Southern Europe' by examining the development of party discourse in manifestos produced specifically for European elections. Following previous theoretical arguments, we have posited that the new 'integration-demarcation divide' will tend to be embedded in the classic ideological space, which is structured by two broadly conceived traditional conflicts: the left-right dimension which captures a conflict over distributional preferences and the economic role of government (which reflects the historical class cleavage); and a cultural-political conflict informed by different value divides. We hypothesized
that the nature of this globalization-inspired divide will lead to a specific route of embedment into national ideological spaces: the different components of the integration-demarcation dimensions will tend to supplement the content of the traditional cultural dimension.

The findings have confirmed that the new divide has surfaced in the Southern periphery of Europe, much like the European core, and in some ways its impact on the structure of ideological space has been even more profound compared to other European countries. The common narrative that emerges in the region is that the integration-demarcation axis follows the European pattern of assuming near-orthogonal positions to the left-right materialist axis, (re)producing standard two-dimensional spaces (cf. Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008a), but the difference is that the latter seems to produce considerable weaker structuring effects in the countries of Southern Europe. The only outlier in the former sense is Spain, where political parties seem to adopt similar stances when it comes to the dilemmas of globalization and Europeanization. Differences on the cultural domain emerge around more standard issues, whereas boundary concerns become issues of contention only when it comes to preferences over the status of the autonomous communities.

In the other three countries, the observed location within national ideological spaces of the three categories associated with the globalization divide (nativism, economic integration, euroscepticism) exhibit strong tendencies towards unidimensionality and consistent near-orthogonal positions to the left-right materialist axis. Even the nominally economic category (i.e. economic integration), election after election across all the countries of our sample, was most often located in an orthogonal position to the classic distributional categories (i.e. welfare state economy vs. economic liberalism). However, the expectation of consistent directionality of political parties in favor or against integration in all its aspects is strongly challenged by our findings. In fact, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that one cannot speak of a general South European variety of the integration-demarcation dichotomy. Nevertheless, certain partial commonalities do exist.

For example, the occasional contraposition between euroscepticism and nativism in Greece and Portugal can be attributed to the exceptional influence of small leftist parties with their staunch rejection of economic and political aspects of integration and their more ambivalent stances towards immigration and policies of cultural protectionism. In contrast, in Spain, the smaller leftist party (IU) seems less attracted to the various strands of antiglobalization sentiment, while in Italy, there is a clearer divide between the centre-left and the centre-right blocs on the
cultural dimension (including the integration-demarcation axis) than on the left-right materialist axis (even though the shifting positions of LN make it harder to detect a clear and consistent differentiation). The case of Greece, especially after the emergence of LAOS, perhaps exemplifies best a case where not only the integration-demarcation divide undercuts the traditional left-right materialist axis, but where the two most unambiguous exponents of left-wing and right-wing politics (KKE and LAOS respectively) converge on common anti-integration terrain. The trend is not fully replicated in Portugal, due to the absence of a right-wing populist party, even though there is an instance where the PCP and the conservative CDS-PP, operating uninhibited by coalition constraints, converge on boundary issues. The ways in which globalization impacts domestic political systems continue to evolve. Conflicts and divisions over issues related to the ceding of national sovereignty to the EU level or stances toward immigration often rage increasingly within as well as between parties, making it harder to assess the importance of such divisions by focusing exclusively on party manifestos. Perhaps the current sovereign debt crisis which, in many ways, constitutes a shared experience for the countries of Southern Europe, will highlight the centrality of globalization-related processes in the lives for ordinary citizens, and accelerate the politicization of stances towards the phenomena of globalization and European integration in uniform ways.

References


Bornschier, Simon. 2010. The new cultural divide and the two-dimensional political space in Western Europe. West European Politics 33(3): 419-44.


Euromanifestos Handbook 2009 (Euromanifestos Coding Scheme/ EMCS III)


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1 The study by van der Brug and van Spanje finds an impact at the level of public opinion only.
2 Globalization can be broadly defined as the accelerated movement of goods, services, capital, technologies, people and ideas across national borders. The notion of Europeanization has been conceptualized in several different ways in the literature; it primarily – but not exclusively – refers to the domestic impacts of European-level institutions and norms. However, the effects of these processes on the domestic politics of European member-states are not always uniform and, in certain policy areas, it can be said that they are not even unidirectional, as Europeanization can function as a buffer against certain aspects of globalization. Nevertheless, it is often very hard to disentangle the effects of globalization from the effects of Europeanization. The latter, like globalization, accelerates economic, social and cultural integration and homogenization, profoundly redefines the limits of national sovereignty, affects democratic accountability and legitimacy, and creates similar anxieties related to questions of citizenship and cultural identity (Jahko and Menzler 2003, 3).
3 The roots of the EMP go back to the flagship study of party manifestos for national elections, the cross-national Manifesto Research Group (MRG)/Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP). The Euromanifesto Project started in 2000, when Hermann Schmitt started to apply the MRG/CMP approach of analyzing party manifesto content to European Parliament elections. For more details see Braun et al. (2006).
4 This is one of the components of the Collaborative Project on Providing an Infrastructure for Research on Electoral Democracy in the European Union (PIREDEU). For more details go online at: http://www.piredeu.eu/
5 The original Euromanifesto Coding Scheme (EMCS) includes a range of policy domains: external relations, freedom and democracy, political system, economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society and social groups. They are further divided into several content categories and sub-categories.