The Moral Status of Institutional Negligence

Abstract

The moral status of negligent actions presents a unique quandary because these actions are prima facie unintentional, but preventable with due care. Legally culpable negligent acts occur without malicious intent but result in harm, and the agent owed care to the victim, but failed to act with the appropriate care due. In this essay, I argue that the moral status of negligent actions varies depending on whether the agent is an individual, or an organization or institution. I contend that while negligence is often only minimally morally blameworthy for individual agents, it is significantly more blameworthy for an organization or institution. As agents, institutions are different in kind from individuals, partly due to their superior capacities, which give them the ability to shape their own character, and therefore the moral fault of their vices that lead to culpably negligent actions are morally weightier than those of individuals.