ARGUMENTATIVE HYPOCRISY AND CONSTITUENT DEBATES: THE ITALIAN CASE
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.2.1.92Keywords:
Argumentation theory, Political argumentation, Rhetoric, Constitutional law, ElsterAbstract
Jon Elster suggested that even speakers who are not moved “by a concern for the common good”, but whose concerns are “purely self-interested”, may be still forced or induced “to substitute the language of impartial argument for the language of self-interest”. This substitution would be the fruit of the civilizing force of hypocrisy. This argumentative hypocrisy is a key concept for understanding a process of negotiation through persuasive strategies typical in constitutional debates. Particularly, Elster believes that “the most important requirement” of a bargaining theory should be “that we are able to specify what will happen during a temporary breakdown of cooperation”. The constituents can get out of an impasse caused by a non-cooperative situation resorting to argumentative hypocrisy. The paper will analyse some examples taken from the debate which led to the final version of the Italian Constitution.
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