A REPLY TO RONALD DWORKIN’S CRITIQUE OF MORAL SKEPTICISM
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.4.1.186Keywords:
Dworkin, moral skepticism, objectivity, truth, unity of value, pluralism of valuesAbstract
This paper focuses on “indeterminacy”, “objectivity” and “truth” in the work of Ronald Dworkin. The text is divided into four parts: first, I will expose the general structure of Dworkin’s conception of objectivity in the moral domain (Section 1). Next, I will present the main critiques Dworkin addresses to two of his most important philosophical enemies, namely the “external skeptic” (Section 2.1) and the “internal skeptic” (Section 2.2). I then intend to address Dworkin’s critiques by presenting counterarguments in defense of moral skepticism (Section 3). In order to clarify the debate and its points, I try to illustrate the arguments with examples whenever possible. In the concluding Section (4), I recapitulate the main points of the text.
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