Three kinds of self-respect in Rawls
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.5.2.207Keywords:
dignity, recognition respect, appraisal respect, moral personality, liberalismAbstract
Rawls’s remarks on self-respect have been described as cryptic or ambiguous. The discussion on the meaning of respect and, specifically, Rawlsian self-respect has been considerably influenced by Darwall’s distinction between recognition respect and appraisal respect. This paper defends that Darwall’s dichotomic misses an important dimension of Rawlsian self-respect which can be termed “value-confidence”. This third kind of self-respect concerns one’s confidence in the value of the particular conception of the good one has chosen. Value-confidence differs from recognition self-respect, even if both dimensions are intimately connected. The distinction between recognition self-respect and value-confidence resembles the dual nature of moral personality in Rawls and the different roles of basic institutions and communities of interests.
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