Substantive or Procedural Autonomy: Willing Slaves and Deferential Housewives

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.6.1.5236

Palavras-chave:

Autonomia, Feminismo, Mulheres, Opressão, Deferência

Resumo

A autonomia continua a ser um conceito central, embora contestado, para o feminismo contemporâneo. Em parte, isso resulta de uma tensão que define o conceito de autonomia. Simplificando, como pode um conceito de autonomia, de escolha, explicar a escolha de não escolher? Neste artigo, argumento que uma consideração a partir das condições procedimentais e neutras de conteúdo da autonomia no trabalho no passado, presente e futuro de um agente permite uma visão da socialização opressiva sem incorporar limites substantivos dentro do próprio conceito de autonomia. Esta concepção de autonomia promove uma avaliação da escolha em termos das condições aparentes no ato de escolher e lança luz sobre as forças opressoras que diminuem essas condições. Conceber a autonomia como algo que ocorre ao longo do tempo e no futuro também oferece uma visão sobre a compatibilidade de deferência e autonomia. Essa abordagem da autonomia acomoda melhor as multiplicidades de identidades, valores e objetivos humanos.

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Publicado

2023-08-11

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Walsh, M. B. (2023). Substantive or Procedural Autonomy: Willing Slaves and Deferential Housewives. Ética, Política & Sociedade, 6(1), 1–26. https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.6.1.5236

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