A COMPENSAÇÃO COMO REPARAÇÃO MORAL E COMO JUSTIFICAÇÃO MORAL DOS RISCOS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.2.1.81Palavras-chave:
compensação, pedidos de desculpas, reparações, restituição, reparação moralResumo
Será a compensação capaz de reparar o dano moral causado por um acto errado anterior? Por um lado, há quem defina a função da reparação como reposição do equilíbrio moral. Por outro, a perspectiva dominante acerca da compensação considera que esta é insuficiente para reparar totalmente o dano moral a não ser que seja acompanhada de um acto de castigo ou de um pedido de desculpas. Neste artigo procuro investigar o potencial máximo da compensação. Uma distinção entre compensação apologética e compensação não apologética é central para o meu argumento. A compensação apologética é um acto que exprime arrependimento e um pedido de desculpas através de uma oferta de dinheiro, bens ou serviços. A compensação não apologética é um acto que procura restaurar a perda ou dano sem exprimir arrependimento ou um pedido de desculpas. Neste artigo, defendo a perspectiva segundo a qual os actos de compensação podem ser apologéticos e argumento que uma compensação apologética deste tipo é suficiente para a reparação moral.
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