O ESFORÇO COMO RESPONSABILIDADE

Autores

  • David Jenkins University of Warwick

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.2.1.83

Palavras-chave:

sorte, esforço, responsabilidade, controlo, circunstância

Resumo

John Roemer criou um modelo através do qual a distinção que o igualitarismo da sorte estabelece entre escolha e sorte pode ser usada para motivar decisões reais acerca de políticas públicas. Através de uma divisão da sociedade em "tipos", Roemer sugere que é possível limitar as comparações entre diferentes pessoas àquilo que essas pessoas são capazes de controlar. Ao fazer isto, a acção
individual responsável torna-se o único meio pelo qual as desigualdades podem ser justificadas e, simultaneamente, um meio de defender legislação redistributiva muito mais transformadora. No entanto, o modelo repousa sobre dois tipos de comparação - tanto dentro de cada tipo como entre tipos - que, em última instância, põem em causa a pretensão de Roemer de estar a medir a acção responsável. O modelo presume que não é problemático comparar o esforço entre indivíduos situados em circunstâncias radicalmente desiguais; e também presume que o tipo é capaz de verificar circunstâncias de uma forma que ignora a enorme contingência que constitui a vida humana. Em consequência disto, a ambiciosa proposta de Roemer não é capaz de aplicar na prática a distinção entre escolha e sorte.

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Publicado

2023-09-29

Como Citar

Jenkins, D. . (2023). O ESFORÇO COMO RESPONSABILIDADE. Ética, Política & Sociedade, 2, 65–92. https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.2.1.83