Reflective equilibrium is enough: against the need for preselecting considered judgements
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.5.2.210Palavras-chave:
Equilíbrio reflexivo, juízos bem ponderados, John Rawls, métodos da filosofia prática, filtro epistémico, justificação moralResumo
Neste artigo focamo-nos num elemento controverso do método do equilíbrio reflexivo, nomeadamente a ideia de Rawls de que os compromissos que entram no processo justificatório deveriam ser pré-seleccionados ou filtrados: de acordo com Rawls, apenas os juízos bem ponderados deveriam ser levados em conta na filosofia moral. Os críticos deste processo de filtragem distribuem-se por dois campos: 1) Os críticos do equilíbrio reflexivo rejeitam o processo de filtragem rawlsiano por ser excessivamente fraco e procuram um que seja mais fiável e que constituiria um diferente método epistémico; 2) Os proponentes do equilíbrio reflexivo rejeitam o processo de filtragem Rawlsiano por ser excessivamente excludente. Nós defendemos o ER, em oposição aos seus críticos, argumentando que este método pode assegurar compromissos razoáveis sem estar dependente de um processo externo forte de filtragem. No entanto, alinhamo-nos com os proponentes críticos do equilíbrio reflexivo, defendendo que, sem este processo de filtragem fraco, o ER rawlsiano revela-se como mais plausível tanto como um método geral, como no contexto da filosofia moral.
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