Rawls contra Rawls: legitimacy, normative impact, and the basic structure
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.5.2.209Palavras-chave:
Rawls, legitimidade política, liberalismo político, autoridade, estrutura básicaResumo
Neste artigo, estabeleço um contraste entre duas abordagens à legitimidade política, ambas influenciadas por Rawls. Uma é a imagem clássica do liberalismo político, de acordo com a qual um estado é legítimo se os seus elementos constitucionais essenciais pudessem ser aceites por cidadãos razoáveis. A alternativa é a ideia de que o que faz um estado legítimo é primariamente o seu sucesso em organizar a estrutura básica de uma tal maneira que seja demonstravelmente favorável aos governados. Mais em particular, eu sugiro que um estado é legítimo na medida em que organiza a estrutura básica de uma forma que torne mais fácil para os seus cidadãos comportarem-se de forma justa uns com os outros e fazerem escolhas autónomas. Em seguida, passo a demonstrar a superioridade desta solução ao problema da legitimidade, em termos do seu impacto normativo, face à solução proposta pelo liberalismo político, mesmo quando se leva em conta um desacordo razoável sobre a questão da justiça.
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